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Military Retirement:  Major Legislative Issues
SUMMARY
The military retirement system includes
benefits for retirement after an active or re-
serve military career, disability retirement, and
survivor benefits for eligible survivors of
deceased retirees.
The proposed change to the system
generating the most current legislative activity
involves whether some or all military retirees
should be allowed to receive both military
retired pay and any VA disability compensa-
tion to which they are otherwise entitled; this
is referred to as “concurrent receipt.”  A
longer-term issue beginning to attract some
attention is whether some military personnel
should be entitled to military retired pay with
less than 20 years of service and whether
many more personnel should serve well past
the 20-year point before retiring.
Concurrent Receipt.  Current law prov-
ides that military retired pay be reduced by the
amount of VA disability compensation.  Some
maintain this is inequitable and unfair; it has
been defended on grounds of cost and of the
need to avoid setting a precedent for concur-
rent receipts of numerous other benefits.
The FY2003 National Defense Authori-
zation Act contained provisions that provide
for DOD payments to certain military retirees,
either with (1) a Purple Heart indicating a
combat wound  and at least a 10% disability;
or (2) at least a 60% disability incurred as a
result of armed conflict, but not a wound
leading to a Purple Heart; hazardous duty;
field training, exercises, war games, and the
like; and injuries incurred due to the opera-
tions of combat vehicles, naval vessels, or
military aircraft. The payments will be equal
to the amount of VA disability compensation
to which the retiree is entitled, but the new
legislation does not end the requirement that
the retiree’s military retired pay be reduced by
whatever VA compensation to which the
retiree is entitled.  Therefore, the eligible
retirees will receive the financial equivalence
of concurrent receipt, but in legal and statutory
terms it will not constitute concurrent receipt.
This compromise was been approved by the
Bush Administration. It is likely that
concurrent receipt will be the object of intense
legislative activity in the 108th Congress, as
the 2002 legislation did not address the
fundamental issue of the existing statutory ban
on concurrent receipt.
Changing the 20-Year Retirement
Paradigm.  For several decades, some have
argued that requiring military personnel to
serve at least 20 years before being eligible for
retirement is inefficient and expensive.  Oth-
ers have argued that it is essential to maintain-
ing a high-quality career force capable of
meeting wartime requirements. Some Bush
Administration senior officials have stated
that the 20-year retirement norm should be
modified but have also cautioned that such
change should not affect those personnel
currently serving.  Discussion of such changes
has been somewhat muted in the aftermath of
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
There are rumors, however, that senior DOD
officials want to begin some test or pilot
programs in 2003 (FY2004) that would mod-
ify the 20-year retirement paradigm for some
career members in particular services or
occupational specialties.
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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On December 2, 2002, the President signed the FY2003 National Defense Authorization
Act (P.L. 107-314; 116 Stat. 2458).  It contains provisions that provide for DOD payments
to certain military retirees, either with (1) a Purple Heart indicating a combat wound  and at
least a 10% disability; or (2) at least a 60% disability incurred as a result of armed conflict
(but which may not result in a Purple Heart; i.e., not be a wound), hazardous duty, field
training/exercises, or from operations of combat vehicles, naval vessels, or military aircraft.
The payments will be equal to the amount of VA disability compensation to which the retiree
is entitled, but the new legislation does not end the requirement that the retiree’s military
retired pay be reduced by whatever VA compensation to which the retiree is entitled.
Therefore, the eligible retirees will receive the financial equivalence of concurrent receipt,
but in legal and statutory terms it will not constitute concurrent receipt.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Military Retirement:  Key Elements and Issues
Conceptual and Political Setting
Congress confronts both constituent concerns and budgetary constraints in considering
military retirement issues.  The approximately 2.0 million military retirees and survivor
benefit recipients, and their roughly six to eight million family members, have been, and
continue to be, an articulate and well-educated constituent group familiar with the legislative
process and represented by associations staffed with military retirees with long experience
in working with Congress.  In recent years, the long-standing efforts by military retirees and
their associations to secure more benefits for their members have been buttressed by (1) the
outpouring of nation-wide nostalgia and support for the past heroism and current old-age
needs of the “greatest generation” of World War II-era veterans, whether retirees or not; (2)
concern over problems the military services were having in recruiting and retaining sufficient
numbers of qualified personnel, which began in the mid-1990s, and the extent to which
actual or perceived inadequacies in retirement benefits may have been contributing to these
problems; (3) the impression by many current or former military personnel that the Clinton
Administration was not favorably disposed toward the military as an institution, leading to
efforts to portray increased retirement benefits as a palliative, and (4) in a reversal of the
attitudes toward the Clinton Administration, efforts to obtain more benefits from the Bush
Administration because it is perceived as being pro-military.  And, since September 11,
2001, there has been a predictably dramatic increase in public and congressional support for
the Armed Forces.
In addition, it can be posited that the policy choices posed by recently-enacted increased
benefits for military retirees are an integral part of a larger debate in the United States over
the distribution of pension-type resources among younger workers and older retirees.  In the
defense context, it may take the form of conflicts between DOD and current active duty and
reserve military personnel on the one hand, with the responsibility of defending the United
States in the present, and retired military personnel, many of whom feel that they are losing
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benefits to which they assumed they would always have access.   On the other hand, it can
be argued that, in a defense budget close to $400 billion yearly, benefits which cost the DOD
budget only $7-8 billion yearly are not significant enough to force serious policy choices
between current defense capability on the one hand, and, on the other, pensions for those
who, despite their patriotic service, are not providing any current defense capability.
In general, in recent years Congress has been more aggressive than the executive branch
in responding to the stated concerns of retirees about their benefits.  The Department of
Defense (DOD) and other executive branch agencies have, over time, tended to regard
military retirement benefits as a place where substantial budgetary savings could be made.
For instance, as noted below, Congress took the initiative in 1999 to repeal the “Redux” cuts
in future military retired pay that was originally enacted in 1986.  
Program Summary
In FY2004, total federal budget outlays for military retirement will be an estimated
$36.7 billion and DOD budget outlays will be an estimated $12.5 billion.  (The differing
figures for total federal and DOD outlays result from the use of the accrual method in
accounting for the costs of military retirement.  See the section below on Cost Data for a
discussion of accrual accounting.  These numbers, taken from Table 2, below, also differ
slightly from those in Table 1, immediately below, for purely technical reasons without
policy significance.)  Table 1 shows the estimated numbers of retirees, and the  costs to the
federal government of the retired pay they receive, for FY2002-FY2004.
Table 1.  DOD Retired Military Personnel and Survivors:
Estimated Numbers and Costs, FY2002-FY2004
Total
Retirees from
an Active Duty
Military Career
Disability
Retirees
Reserve
Retirees
Survivor
Benefit
Recipients
FY2004
2,022,000/
$37.14 billion
1,400,000/
$30.80 billion
91,000/
$1.24 billion
254,000/
$2.91 billion
272,000/
$2.19 billion
FY2003
2,008,000/
$36.16 billion
1,392,000/
$29.98 billion
93,000/
$1.26 billion
251,000/
$2.80 billion
269,000/
$2.12 billion
FY2002
1,993,000/
$35.25 billion
1,384,000/
$29.22 billion
 96,000/
$1.28 billion
248,000/
$2.69 billion
265,000/
$2.06 billion
Sources: Office of the Actuary.  Department of Defense.  Valuation of the Military Retirement System.
September 30, 2001: K-8, K-10, K-14, K-16, L-2, and L-4.  Document available online from the Office of the
DOD Actuary at[ http://dod.mil/actuary/#].
“Redux”:  Its 1986 Enactment and 1999 Repeal
Cuts in retired pay for future retirees were enacted in the Military Retirement Reform
Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-348, July 1, 1986; the “1986 Act,” now referred to frequently as the
“Redux” military retirement system).  Although enactment of Redux in 1986 represented a
success for those who argued that the pre-Redux system was too generous, the repeal of
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compulsory Redux in late 1999 by the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act indicated
that, at least in Congress, those who defend the pre-Redux system are again ascendant.
Congress began taking notice publicly of  potential problems related to Redux in 1997,
well before the executive branch addressed the issue. During the fall of 1998, the
Administration announced that it supported Redux repeal.   Eventually, the FY2000 National
Defense Authorization Act contained provisions for repealing compulsory Redux; it allows
post-August 1, 1986 entrants to retire under the pre-Redux system or opt for Redux plus an
immediate $30,000 cash payment(see below).
Entitlement to Retired Pay and Retired Pay Computation Base
A service member becomes entitled to retired pay upon completion of 20 years of
service, regardless of age.  (The average nondisabled enlisted member retiring from an active
duty military career in FY2001 was 42 years old and had 22 years of service; the average
officer was 47 years old and had 24 years of service.)  A member who retires from active
duty is paid an immediate monthly annuity based on a percentage of his or her retired pay
computation base.  For persons who entered military service before September 8, 1980, the
retired pay computation base is final monthly basic pay being received at the time of
retirement.  For those who entered service on or after September 8, 1980, the computation
base is the average of the highest 3 years (36 months) of basic pay. (Basic pay is one
component of total Regular Military Compensation, or RMC, which consists of basic pay,
housing and subsistence allowances, and the federal tax advantage that accrues because the
allowances are not taxable.  Basic pay comprises approximately 70% of the total for all
retirement eligibles–75% for 30-year retirees and 66% for 20-year retirees.  Thus, the 20-year
retiree may get 50% of retired pay computation base upon retirement, but only 33% of RMC.
The 30-year retiree will receive 75% of the computation base, but only 56% of RMC.  Nor
do any of these calculations include any of the many special pays, bonuses or other cash
compensation to which many military members are entitled.)
Retired Pay Computation Formula
Military Personnel Who First Entered the Service before August 1, 1986.
All military personnel who first entered military service before August 1, 1986, have their
retired pay computed at the rate of 2.5% of the retired pay computation base for each year
of service.  The minimum amount of retired pay to which a member entitled to compute his
or her retired  pay under this formula is therefore 50% of the retired pay computation base
(20 years of service X 2.5%).  A 25-year retiree receives 62.5% of the computation base (25
years of service X 2.5%).  The maximum, reached at the 30-year mark, is 75% of the
computation base (30 years of service X 2.5%).
Military Personnel Who First Entered the Service on or after August 1,
1986.  Personnel who first enter service on or after August 1, 1986, in accordance with the
provisions of the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, are required to select one of
two options in calculating their retired pay within 180 days of reaching 15 years of service:
Option 1:  Pre-Redux.  They can opt to have their retired pay computed in
accordance with the pre-Redux formula, described above, but with a slightly modified COLA
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formula, which is less generous than that of the pre-Redux formula (see below, under
COLAs).
Option 2:  Redux.  They can opt to have their retired pay computed in accordance
with the Redux formula and receive an immediate $30,000 cash bonus (which can actually
be paid in several annual installments if the recipient so wishes, for tax purposes). 
The Redux Formula:  Under Age 62 Retirees.  Redux is different from the previous
formula in two major ways.  First, for retirees under age 62, retired pay will be computed at
the rate of 2.0% of the retired pay computation base for each year of service through 20, and
3.5% for each year of service from 21-30.  Under this new formula, therefore, a 20-year
retiree will receive 40% of his or her retired pay computation base upon retirement (20 years
of service X 2.0%), and a 25-year retiree will receive 57.5% of the computation base [(20
years of service X 2.0%) + (5 years of service X 3.5%)].  A 30-year retiree, however, will
continue to receive 75% of the retired pay computation base [(20 years of service X 2.0%)
+ (10 years of service X 3.5%)].  The changed formula, therefore, is “skewed” much more
sharply in favor of the longer-serving military careerist, theoretically providing an incentive
to remain on active duty longer before retiring.  
The Redux Formula: Retirees 62 and Older.  Second, when a retiree reaches age
62, his or her retired pay will be recomputed based on the old formula — a straight 2.5% of
the retired pay computation base for each year of service.  Thus, beginning at 62, the 20-year
retiree receiving 40% of the computation base for retired pay, according to the new formula,
will begin receiving 50% of his or her original computation base; the 25-year retiree’s
annuity will jump from 57.5% of the original computation base to 62.5%; and the 30-year
retiree’s annuity, already at 75% of the original computation base under both the old and new
formulas, will not change.  (Note:  this change is an increase in monthly retired pay, not a
lump sum at age 62.) 
Temporary  Early  Retirement Authority (TERA), 1992-2001
 (FY1993-FY2001)
The FY1993 National Defense Authorization Act (Sec. 4403, P.L. 102-484) granted
temporary authority (which expired on September 30, 2001) for the services to offer early
retirements to personnel with more than 15 but less than 20 years of service.  TERA  retired
pay was calculated in the usual ways except that there is an additional reduction of one
percent for every year of service below 20.  Part or all of this latter reduction could be
restored if the retiree worked in specified  public service jobs (such as law enforcement,
firefighting, and education) during the period immediately following retirement, until the
point at which the retiree would have reached the 20-year mark if he or she had remained in
the service.
Military Retired Pay and Social Security
Military personnel do not contribute a percentage of their salary to help pay for
retirement benefits.  They have paid taxes into the social security trust fund since January 1,
1957, and are entitled to full social security benefits based on their military service.  Military
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retired pay and social security are not offset against each other; military retirees receive full
social security benefits in addition to their military retired pay.
Modifying 20-Year Retirement
For more than 30 years, the military retirement system, in particular, its central feature
of allowing career personnel to retire at any age with an immediate annuity upon completing
20 years of service, has been the object of intense criticism and equally intense support
among military personnel, politicians, and defense manpower analysts.  Critics of the system
have alleged, since its basic tenets were established by legislation enacted in the late 1940s,
that it costs too much, has lavish benefits, and contributes to inefficient military personnel
management by inducing too many personnel to stay until the 20-year mark and too few to
stay beyond the 20-year mark.  At present, they say, too few people are willing to make the
commitment to stay the full 20 years, causing DOD to lose too many talented people in the
8-12 year range.  In addition, the requirement for officers to perform a certain amount of joint
(interservice) duty, plus acquiring a well-rounded competence in their own services’
capabilities, has created a situation in which 20 years is simply not enough time for an officer
to serve in enough jobs to learn all that is needed to prepare for higher command and staff
duties.  This allegedly shows a need for more officers to serve well past 20 years.  In fact, the
mandatory joint duty requirements are the only new factor in this issue, which has been an
object of controversy since the late 1960s.  Many analysts, however, feel that the joint duty
requirements have, in connection with other duty required of an officer to attain a sufficient
level of competence in his or her grade, simply made a 20-year career incapable of
attainment–all of the service requirements cannot be “crammed into” 20 years.
Others have strongly defended the existing system as essential to recruiting and
maintaining sufficient high-quality career military personnel who could withstand the rigors
of arduous peacetime training and deployments as well as war. They tend to agree with the
statement that “20-year retirement makes up with power what it lacks in subtlety,” by
providing a 20-year “pot of gold at the end of the rainbow.”  Without the latter, it is argued,
too few personnel would be willing to put up with the great stresses of a military career.  At
the same time, the incentive to depart soon after reaching the 20-year mark supposedly
prevents the armed forces from being saddled with over-age and unfit officers and NCOs,
unquestionably a major problem in the early stages of both World Wars.  Since 20-year
retirement was adopted in the late 1940s, the latter problem has not surfaced when U.S.
forces have been in combat.  It is also suggested that DOD already has the tools to cope with
the problems of insufficient retention of middle-grade personnel and with overloaded officer
career patterns:  the former by using special pays and bonuses and adequate overall military
compensation and the latter by exercising existing discretionary authority in statute to keep
more personnel on active duty well past the 20-year mark.
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and other senior defense officials have suggested on
several occasions that the existing 20-year retirement paradigm should be modified.  In
general, though, they have cautioned, however, that they do not want to cause undue alarm,
or negate individual career decisions already made, by introducing such changes too abruptly.
Discussion about such “reforms”–i.e., cuts–in retired pay entitlements was muted in the
aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks.  However, there have been recent rumors that
senior DOD officials want to initiate test or pilot programs that would modify the 20-year
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retirement paradigm for some particular occupational skills, in particular services, beginning
in 2003 (i.e., during consideration of the Department’s FY2004 budget).  These would
possibly include longer terms of service for general and flag officers; allowing some
personnel in specialties that require a great deal of training investment to stay on active duty,
without being forced out of service, well past the 20-year mark; and providing additional
severance-pay type benefits for some personnel whom the services do not need to stay as
long as 20 years.  
Retired Pay and Survivor Benefit COLAs
Military retired pay is protected against inflation by statute (10 USC 1401a).  The
Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986, in conjunction with recent changes in the FY2000
National Defense Authorization Act, provides for cost of living adjustments (COLAs) as
indicated below.  Congress has not modified the COLA formula since FY1996 (1995),
although virtually every year since 1982 some COLA modifications–always with the aim of
reducing costs, and hence the payments to retirees–have been at least discussed. Therefore,
it is probably inadvisable to assume at any time that COLAs will be totally off the table in
future Congresses.   For further information on COLAs, see CRS Report 98-223, COLAs for
Military Retirees: Summary of Congressional and Executive Branch Action, 1982-2002
(FY1983-FY2003).  
What Was the Last COLA and What Will be the Next COLA?
The most recent military retirement COLA was 2.6%, first applied to the retired pay
disbursed on January 1, 2002.  The most recent previous COLA was that of January 1,
2001, of 3.5%.  The COLA which will become effective on January 1, 2003, will be 1.4%,
the second smallest since COLAs began in 1963 (the smallest were 1.3% in FY1998 and
FY1986).   For a discussion of proposed and actual COLA changes over the past 20 years,
see CRS Report 98-223, COLAs for Military Retirees: Summary of Congressional and
Executive Branch Action, 1982-2002 (FY1983-FY2003).
COLAs for Pre-August 1, 1986 Entrants
For military personnel who first entered military service before August 1, 1986, each
December a cost-of-living-adjustment (COLA) equal to the percentage increase in the
Consumer Price Index (CPI) between the third quarters of successive years will be applied
to military retired pay for the annuities paid beginning each January  1.  For example, assume
that the Consumer Price Index rises from 400.0 in September 2005 to 412.0 in September
2006, an increase of 12.0 points or 3.0% of 400.0.  The monthly retired pay that accrues
during December 2006, and will actually be paid to retirees on January 1, 2007, would be
increased by 3.0% above that amount paid the previous month.
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COLAs for Personnel Who Entered Service On or After August 1,
1986
For those personnel who first entered military service on or after August 1, 1986, the
FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act provides that their COLAs will be calculated
in accordance with either of two methods, as noted below.
Non-Redux Recipients.  Those personnel who opt to have their retired pay
computed in accordance with the pre-Redux formula will have their COLAs computed as
described above for pre-August 1, 1986 entrants.
Redux/$30,000 Cash Bonus Recipients.  Those personnel who opt to have their
retired pay computed in accordance with the Redux formula, and receive the $30,000 cash
bonus, will have their COLAs computed as follows.  Annual COLAs will be held to one
percentage point below the actual inflation rate for retirees under age 62.  Retirees covered
by this new COLA formula would thus receive a 2.0% increase (rather than 3.0%) in their
military retired pay under the hypothetical example described in the above paragraph.  When
a retiree reaches age 62, there will be a one-time recomputation of his or her annuity to make
up for the lost purchasing power caused by the holding of COLAs to the inflation rate minus
one percentage point.  This recomputation will be applied to the old, generally more liberal
retired pay computation formula on which retirees 62 or older will have their annuities
computed (see the above subsection entitled Retired Pay Computation Formula),
compounding, for most retirees, the size of this one-time annuity increase.  After the
recomputation at 62, however, future COLAs will continue to be computed on the basis of
the inflation rate minus one percentage point. 
Costs and Benefits of the Two Retirement Alternatives.   An analysis of the
economic effects for hypothetical retirees indicates that in almost all cases opting for the pre-
Redux formula will pay the individual much more over time.  A report of the Center for
Naval Analyses states that the more liberal retired pay computation formula and COLA
formula of pre-Redux far outweighs the short-term benefits of a $30,000 pre-tax cash bonus.
The report did say that it might be possible for an individual investor to “beat” these negative
aspects of the bonus by wise investment decisions but that it would be difficult.  Naturally,
no study can know what an individual’s financial situation is.   Preliminary results of the first
few months of the Redux option has shown that a fairly small percentage –  5% of officers
and 13% of enlisted retirees – have opted for the $30,000 lump sum.  However, the
proportion of military personnel opting for the lump sum has been rising, despite the fact that
in virtually all cases it provides less money in the long run.
Military Retirement Budgeting and Costs
Accounting for Military Retirement in the Federal Budget
All DOD budgets through FY1984 reflected the costs of retired pay actually being paid
out to personnel who had already retired.  Congress simply appropriated the amount of
money required to pay current retirees each year.  Since FY1985, the “accrual accounting”
concept has been used to budget for the costs of military retired pay.  Under this system, the
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DOD budget for each fiscal year reflects the estimated amount of money that must be set
aside and accrued at interest – actually, invested in special, non-marketable U.S. government
securities similar in some ways to Treasury bills and bonds –  to fund the retired pay to which
persons currently in the Armed Forces during that fiscal year, and who ultimately retire, will
be entitled in the future.  These estimated future retirement costs are arrived at by making
projections based on the past rates at which active duty military personnel stayed in the
service until retirement, and on assumptions regarding the overall U.S. economy, such as
interest rates, inflation rates, and military pay levels.  These DOD budget outlays for
retirement are computed as a percentage of a fiscal year’s total military pay costs for each
military service.  Approximately 35-40% of military basic pay costs must be added to the
DOD personnel budget each fiscal year to cover the future retirement costs of those
personnel who ultimately retire from the military.
DOD budget outlays in each fiscal year that pay for the estimated cost of future retirees
are transferred in a paper transaction to a Military Retirement Fund, located in the Income
Security Function of the federal budget.  The Military Retirement Fund also receives [paper]
transfers from the General Fund of the Treasury to fund the initial unfunded liability of the
military retirement system.  This is the total future cost of military retired pay that will result
from military service performed prior to the implementation of accrual accounting in
FY1985.  Money is disbursed from this Military Retirement Fund to current retirees.
Individual retirees continue to receive their retired pay from DOD finance centers.
Technically, however, because this money paid to individuals comes not from the DOD
budget, but from the Fund, it is paid out by the Income Security function of the federal
budget.  Actual payments to current retirees thus show up in the federal budget as outlays
from the federal budget as a whole, but not from DOD.  Under accrual accounting, therefore,
total federal outlays for each fiscal year continue to reflect only costs of payments to military
members who have already retired, as was the case before accrual accounting began.  Accrual
accounting only changes the manner in which the federal government accounts for military
retired pay; it does not affect actual payments to individuals in any way.
Unfunded Liability
Current debates over both federal civilian and military retirement have included some
discussion of the “unfunded liability” of both.  As noted above, the military retirement
system’s unfunded liability consists of future retired pay costs incurred before the creation
of the Military Retirement Fund in FY1985.  These obligations are being liquidated by the
payment to the Fund each year of an amount from the General Fund of the Treasury, and will
be fully paid, based on current calculations, by FY2033.  The unfunded liability at the end
of FY2001 was $539.6 billion; the estimated liability for FY2002 was $555.2 billion; for
FY2003, $570.1 billion; and for FY2004, $586.7 billion. 
Some concerns have been voiced about the amount  of unfunded liability.  However,
(1) the hundreds of billions of dollars of unfunded liability is a cumulative amount to be paid
to retirees over the next 50 years, not all at once; (2) by the time some persons first become
eligible for retired pay under the pre-accrual accounting system, many others will have died;
and (3) unlike the private sector, there is no way for employees to claim immediate payment
of their future benefits.  An analogy would be that most homeowners cannot afford to pay
cash for a house, so they get a mortgage.  If the mortgage had to be paid in full, almost no
homeowners could afford to do so.  However, spread out over 30 years, the payments are
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affordable.  Similarly, the unfunded liability of federal retirement programs is affordable
when federal retirement outlays are spread over many decades.
Military Retirement Cost Trends
Because military retirement is an entitlement, rather than a discretionary program, its
costs to the total federal budget (payments to current retirees and survivors) always rise
modestly each year, due to a predictable slow rise in the number of retirees and survivors.
The cost to DOD (estimated future retirement costs of current personnel) declined after
FY1989 (the beginning of the post-Cold War drawdown), as the size of the force, and
therefore the number of people who will retire from it in the future, declined.  However, as
the drawdown stabilized, so did the DOD budget costs of retirement.  Table 2 indicates the
costs of military retired pay in federal budget outlays (payments to current retirees) and
Department of Defense accrual outlays (money set aside to fund future retirees).
Table 2.  Military Retirement Outlays
(billions of current dollars)
Total Federal
Budget Outlays
Accrual Outlays from
DOD Budget
Estimated FY2004* $36.7 $12.5
Estimated FY2003* 35.9 12.1
Actual FY2002* 35.1 12.9
Actual FY2001** 34.1 11.4
Actual FY2000** 32.9 11.6
*FY2004 Budget of the United States Government.  Appendix: 859.
**FY2003 Budget of the United States Government.  Appendix: 903.
Concurrent Receipt of Military Retired Pay and 
VA Disability Compensation
Military Retired Pay and VA Disability Compensation: Current
Situation
Most people familiar with military retirement would probably agree that the most
controversial military retirement issue that is currently the object of intense congressional
interest is that involving concurrent receipt of military retired pay and Department of
Veterans’ Affairs (VA) disability compensation.  Current law requires that military retired
pay be reduced by the amount of any VA disability compensation received.  For several years
some military retirees have sought a change in law to permit receipt of all or some of both,
and legislation to allow this has been introduced during the past several Congresses,
frequently having co-sponsors well above half of both the House and the Senate.  This issue
is frequently referred to as “concurrent receipt,” because it would involve the simultaneous
receipt of two types of benefits.  In 2000, legislation was enacted that provides, for certain
seriously disabled retirees, a cash benefit financially identical to what concurrent receipt
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would provide them, but does not in any way change the statute that prohibits concurrent
receipt itself.
The George W. Bush Administration (and the Clinton Administration before it) has
been consistently opposed to concurrent receipt.  The Bush Administration had threatened
to veto the FY2003 National Defense Authorization Act if the Act included a concurrent
receipt provision. It did agree, obviously, to the quasi-concurrent receipt provision of the
FY2003 National Defense Authorization Act, signed by the President on December 2, 2002
(see below).
VA Disability Compensation. To qualify for VA disability compensation, a
determination must be made by the VA that the veteran sustained a particular injury or
disease, or had a preexisting condition aggravated, while serving in the Armed Forces.  Some
exceptions exist for certain conditions that may not have been apparent during military
service but which are presumed to have been service-connected.   The VA has a scale of 10
ratings, from 10% to 100%, although there is no special arithmetic relationship between the
amount of money paid for each step.  Each percentage rating entitles the veteran to a specific
level of disability compensation. In a major difference from the DOD disability retirement
system, a veteran receiving VA disability compensation can ask for a medical reexamination
at any time (or a veteran who does not receive disability compensation upon separation from
service can be reexamined later).  All VA disability compensation is tax-free, which makes
receipt of VA compensation desirable, even with the operation of the offset.
Interaction of DOD and VA Disability Benefits.  Military disability retirees, as
well as retirees not determined disabled by DOD, can also apply to the VA for disability
compensation.  This can be advantageous to retirees who have a DOD disability rating.  For
instance, a retiree whose retired pay is offset by the retiree’s VA compensation nonetheless
receives some advantage because the VA compensation is totally tax-free.  Also, a retiree
may (1) apply for VA compensation any time after leaving the service and (2) have his or her
degree of disability changed by the VA as the result of a later medical reevaluation, as noted
above.  Many retirees seek benefits from the VA years after retirement for a condition that
may have been incurred during military service but that does not manifest itself until many
years later.
Military Disability Retirement.  To qualify for military disability retirement, a
military member must be certified as permanently disabled by a DOD medical examination.
The individual must have (1) at least 20 years of service, or (2) a disability of at least 30%
and have a disability incurred on active duty.  That is, personnel with a disability rated at
30% or more by DOD, but who have less than 20 years of service, can be retired on disability
(there is no minimum limit).  Similarly, personnel with disability of less than 30% can be
retired on disability as long as their disabling condition was incurred while on active duty.
Disability retired pay is computed on the basis of one of two formulae, whichever is more
advantageous to the individual:  (1)  the non-disability  formula described above, or (2) the
retired pay computation base multiplied by the percentage of disability.  DOD makes a
determination of eligibility for disability retirement only once, at the time the individual is
separating from the service.  Although DOD uses the VA schedule of types of disabilities to
determine the percentage of disability, DOD measures disability, or lack thereof, against the
extent to which the individual can or cannot perform military duties, rather than his or her
ability to perform post-service civilian work. A military retiree, regardless of his or her DOD
IB85159 03-12-03
CRS-11
disability status immediately upon retirement, can apply for VA disability compensation at
any time after leaving active military duty.  Military disability retired pay is usually taxable,
unless related to a combat disability.  For further discussion of these and other relevant
issues, see CRS Report 95-469, Military Retirement and Veterans’ Compensation:
Concurrent Receipt Issues. 
“Special Compensation” For Severely Disabled Retirees 
The FY2000, FY2001, and FY2002 National Defense Authorization Acts authorized
what was, in effect, de facto concurrent receipt for severely disabled military retirees, known
in statute as “special compensation.” In FY2003, monthly payments of $50 are authorized
for retirees, both disability and nondisability, with 60% VA disability; $100 for 70% disabled
retirees; $125 for 80%; $225 for 90%; and $325 for 100% VA disabled retirees, if the
disability rating was received from the VA within 4 years of retiring from military service.
This compensation is limited by its statute to retired personnel with at least 20 years of
service.  It therefore is not available to retirees who retired with less than 20 years of service
in accordance with the Temporary  Early  Retirement Authority (TERA) in effect during
1992-2001 (FY1993-FY2001) or with any disability retiree with less than 20 years of active
duty. [10 USC 1413(c)(1)].
On October 1, 2004, the dollar amounts will rise further to $125 for 70%, $150 for
80%, $250 for 90%, and $350 for 100%.   (Sec.641 of the FY2002 Act).  Eligible personnel
need not apply for the pay; their eligibility is identified by DOD and VA computers
automatically.  About 20,000 retirees qualified for these special payments as defined in the
FY2000 and FY2001 laws; it is not yet clear how many additional individuals will be added
to the roll of eligibles by the FY2002 Act, although it will be no more than 23,000 (the
current number of 60% disabled retirees).  The “quasi-concurrent receipt” provisions
contained in the FY2003 defense authorization act, discussed in detail below, do not effect
this special compensation, except that retirees will not be allowed to receive both types of
special compensation; they will be allowed to pick whichever one they find most financially
advantageous.
“Special Compensation” for Certain Disabled Retirees with A
Purple Heart or Disability Due to “Combat-Related” Activities
On December 2, 2002, the President signed the FY2003 National Defense Authorization
Act (P.L. 107-314; 116 Stat. 2458).  This followed the House and Senate approval, on
November 12, 2002, of the  conference report (H.Rept. 107-436) on this Act.  Section 636
of the conference bill contains concurrent-receipt-generated provisions.  Numerous aspects
of the bill language are not necessarily clear upon reading and may well require substantial
administrative interpretation and extensive further analysis to support implementation of the
law.  Section 636 provides for a new category of  DOD “special compensation” for certain
military retirees who has at least 20 years of service, and has either:
! A disability that is “attributable to an injury for which the member was
awarded the Purple Heart,” and is not rated as less than a 10% disability by
DOD or the VA; or
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! At least a 60% disability rating from either DOD or the VA, incurred due to
involvement in “armed conflict,” “hazardous service,” “duty simulating
war,” and “through an instrumentality of war.”   This appears, in lay terms,
to encompass combat with any kind of hostile force; hazardous duty such as
diving, parachuting, using dangerous materials such as explosives, and the
like; individual training and unit training and exercises and maneuvers in the
field;  and “instrumentalities of war” such as accidents in combat vehicles
or, if due to training-related activities, aboard naval vessels or military
aircraft, and accidental injuries due to occurrences such as munitions
explosions, injuries from gases or vapors related to training for combat, and
the like.
The payments will be equal to the amount of VA disability compensation to which the retiree
is entitled, but the new legislation does not end the requirement that the retiree’s military
retired pay be reduced by whatever VA compensation to which the retiree is entitled. 
Under the new law, therefore, the eligible retirees will receive the financial equivalence
of concurrent receipt, but in legal and statutory terms it will not constitute concurrent receipt,
and the statute also states that it explicitly is not retired pay per se. In addition, the law
provides that any retiree eligible for this new special compensation will not be entitled to the
existing special compensation first established in 2000 for potentially concurrent-receipt
eligible retirees.
Military nondisability retirees (those who do not retire from DOD based on any
disability) may be eligible for this combat-disability special compensation, if they receive a
VA disability rating [see subsection 1413a (e)(1)(B)(ii) of title 10, as enacted in the new
law].  As noted above, the VA and the DOD disability determination processes are
independent of each other.  Military disability retirees will be entitled to this new combat-
disability special compensation under specific circumstances.  If they were retired for
disability but were also entitled to have their retired pay computed on the basis of the
nondisability formula (i.e., had at least 20 years of service in most cases), they will be
entitled to any amount of the new special compensation to which the VA disability
determination would entitle them, with one important exception.  This latter exception would
apply to retirees whose disability was so severe that  having their retired pay computed in
accordance with the percentage of disability  would actually give them more money than if
it were computed on the basis of their 20 years or more of service.  For these retirees, their
special compensation would be reduced by the difference between the two formulas.  This
is done on the assumption that to give them the extra due to disability, together with the VA
disability compensation, would in fact be doing what the opponents of concurrent receipt
have argued–giving a person two types of compensation for the same disability.  The
determination as to whether a retiree’s disability is “combat-related” in accordance with the
new statute will be made by DOD.
This new entitlement will become effective 180 days after enactment of the Act; i.e.,
June 2, 2003. By all accounts, DOD is wrestling with the complex issues involved in
defining exactly what kind of disabilities meet the criterion of combat-related other than
those that can be directly attributed to receipt of a Purple Heart.  It is not clear if retirees will
be “grandfathered” regarding the legislation–that is, the extent to which individuals who are
already retired will be allowed to claim the new benefit.  A determination as to such
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eligibility may not by feasible for many retirees based on existing methods and procedures
for immediate pre-retirement physical examinations; such procedures may need to be
changed to conform to the new legislation.  Of potentially greater administrative significance,
if hundreds of thousands of retirees wish to attempt to obtain the new special compensation,
even if most of them are eventually denied, the  burden on the military services’ medical
systems could be substantial.
Prospects for Concurrent Receipt Legislation in the 108th Congress
It is virtually certain that concurrent receipt will be the object of intense legislative
activity in the 108th Congress. The organized military retiree community has stated its
dissatisfaction with the new “special compensation” enacted in the FY2003 National Defense
Authorization Act, arguing that it provides a small benefit to a small number of retirees and,
perhaps more importantly, leaves the statutory ban on concurrent receipt intact.  At the same
time, there is no indication that the Administration would be inclined to drop its strong
opposition to repealing the concurrent receipt ban, up to and including a veto threat, as was
the case with the FY2003 bill.   
The incoming chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator John
Warner, has committed himself to holding hearings on the concurrent receipt issue.  Such
hearings, whether held by the House or Senate Armed Services Committees, will probably
revisit the fundamental pros and cons of the matter.  However, it may well be that by the late
winter and spring of 2003, when any such hearings are held, that the administrative
complexities of implementing the new special compensation, described above, will also be
the object of congressional oversight.  Also, it is possible that if an examination of
concurrent receipt issues involves VA costs, programs, statutes, and regulations, some of
these oversight matters could involve the Veterans Affairs Committees. 
Finally, if the United States becomes involved in a major war with Iraq – even one both
swift and victorious – matters such as concurrent receipt might well be postponed.
Costs of Concurrent Receipt
Overall cost estimates for concurrent receipt in general have varied, depending on the
extent of concurrent receipt allowed, from an annual level of about $50 million (allowing
concurrent receipt for people who are rated by the VA as 100% combat-disabled) to over
almost $6 billion (allowing concurrent receipt for all individuals eligible for military retired
pay and VA disability compensation, with no qualifications–which is far more extensive than
the legislation currently being debated).
According to Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates, the House version of the
FY2003 National Defense Authorization Act’s concurrent receipt  would cost $1.1 billion
in FY2003 and $25 billion over the period FY2003-FY2012; the Senate version, $4.3 billion
and $61 billion respectively.  The House version would cover 110,000 retirees and the
Senate, 700,000. 
Costs of “Special Compensation” for Severely Disabled Retirees Enacted
in 1999-2001 (FY2000-FY2002).  The “special compensation” enacted in the FY2000-
2002 defense authorizations have annual estimated costs of  $83 million-$125 million.  No
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cost estimates have been issued yet about the expansion of these costs in the FY2002 defense
authorization.
Costs of the New “Special Compensation” for Combat-related Disability
Enacted in 2002 (FY2003).  Initial cost estimates for the new “quasi-concurrent receipt”
special compensation benefit vary widely.  Some sources believe that as few as 10,000
individuals will be eligible for the new special compensation.  The most common figure cited
by persons familiar with the conference process is an additional 33,500 people.  However,
assuming that  the FY2003 Act allows all previous retirees to apply for the new benefit, other
analysts assert that several hundred thousand individuals could eventually be eligible.  Cost
estimates reflect this enormous range of estimates of possible beneficiaries; they vary from
FY2004 one-year costs of $200-$400 million or $1billion, and 10-year costs of $4 billion to
$9 billion. 
See CRS Report RS21327, Concurrent Receipt of Military Retirement and VA
Disability Benefits: Budgetary Issues, for a detailed analysis of concurrent receipt costs.
Pros and Cons of Concurrent Receipt
These are only the most frequently cited positions on the issue.  See CRS Report 95-
469,  Military Retirement and Veterans’ Compensation: Concurrent Receipt Issues, for more
arguments pro and con concurrent receipt.
 
Major Arguments IN FAVOR of Concurrent Receipt.
(1) Military retired pay, was earned for length of service; the VA disability
compensation, for disability.  They were therefore for two different things and did not
constitute a duplication of benefits.
(2) If cost was an issue, partial concurrent receipt should be allowed for those most
severely disabled, with combat disability, or whose benefits or total income are the least.
(3) VA disability compensation beneficiaries are entitled to other federal benefits; why
not military retired pay?
(4) People receiving VA disability compensation can receive pensions from a wide
variety of other sources without any offset; why target military retirees?
Major Arguments AGAINST Concurrent Receipt.
(1) The cost of full, or nearly full, concurrent receipt would be enormous — some
estimates say almost  $5 billion yearly.  (See CRS Report RS21327, Concurrent Receipt of
Military Retirement and VA Disability Benefits: Budgetary Issues.)
(2) Eliminating or reducing this offset would “be sticking the camel’s nose into the
tent,” setting a precedent for the reduction or elimination of all kinds of similar offsets of one
or more federal payments, possibly costing billions of dollars (a CRS study identified at least
25 such offsets; see pp. 43-47 of CRS Report 95-469,  Military Retirement and Veterans’
Compensation: Concurrent Receipt Issues).
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(3) Concurrent receipt could result in some individuals getting a new VA medical
evaluation, resulting in a higher disability rating and hence eligibility for concurrent receipt
benefits, or getting a VA evaluation when they had hitherto not done so.  Both results would
lead to more people getting VA compensation for the first time or higher amounts of it.
(4) Although some federal programs do not have an offset against VA disability
compensation, there are no such offsets involving disability and retirement from the same
job and agency where the disability occurred.
(5) VA disability compensation is supposedly authorized much more liberally than
military disability retired pay, and a VA disability can be certified many years after a person
leaves active military service.  Concurrent receipt could lead to a windfall for people whose
VA disability might have had a tenuous connection with their military service.
(6) Concurrent receipt was never promised to those asking for it.
